Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)
I. ITS ESSENCE
In
English this term is frequently employed as equivalent to the laws of nature,
meaning the order which governs the activities of the material universe. Among
the Roman jurists natural law designated those instincts and emotions common to
man and the lower animals, such as the instinct of self-preservation and love
of offspring. In its strictly ethical application-the sense in which this
article treats it-the natural law is the rule of conduct which is prescribed to
us by the Creator in the constitution of the nature with which He has endowed
us.
According
to St. Thomas, the natural law is "nothing else than the rational
creature's participation in the eternal law" (I-II, Q. xciv). The eternal
law is God's wisdom, inasmuch as it is the directive norm of all movement and
action. When God willed to give existence to creatures, He willed to ordain and
direct them to an end. In the case of inanimate things, this Divine direction
is provided for in the nature which God has given to each; in them determinism
reigns. Like all the rest of creation, man is destined by God to an end, and
receives from Him a direction towards this end. This ordination is of a
character in harmony with his free intelligent nature. In virtue of his
intelligence and free will, man is master of his conduct. Unlike the things of
the mere material world he can vary his action, act, or abstain from action, as
he pleases. Yet he is not a lawless being in an ordered universe. In the very
constitution of his nature, he too has a law laid down for him, reflecting that
ordination and direction of all things, which is the eternal law. The rule,
then, which God has prescribed for our conduct, is found in our nature itself.
Those actions which conform with its tendencies, lead to our destined end, and
are thereby constituted right and morally good; those at variance with our
nature are wrong and immoral.
The
norm, however, of conduct is not some particular element or aspect of our
nature. The standard is our whole human nature with its manifold relationships,
considered as a creature destined to a special end. Actions are wrong if,
though subserving the satisfaction of some particular need or tendency, they
are at the same time incompatible with that rational harmonious subordination
of the lower to the higher which reason should maintain among our conflicting
tendencies and desires (see ). For example, to nourish our bodies is right; but
to indulge our appetite for food to the detriment of our corporal or spiritual
life is wrong. Self-preservation is right, but to refuse to expose our life
when the well-being of society requires it, is wrong. It is wrong to drink to
intoxication, for, besides being injurious to health, such indulgence deprives
one of the use of reason, which is intended by God to be the guide and dictator
of conduct. Theft is wrong, because it subverts the basis of social life; and
man's nature requires for its proper development that he live in a state of
society. There is, then, a double reason for calling this law of conduct
natural: first, because it is set up concretely in our very nature itself, and
second, because it is manifested to us by the purely natural medium of reason.
In both respects it is distinguished from the Divine positive law, which
contains precepts not arising from the nature of things as God has constituted
them by the creative act, but from the arbitrary will of God. This law we learn
not through the unaided operation of reason, but through the light of
supernatural revelation.
We may
now analyse the natural law into three constituents: the discriminating norm,
the binding norm (norma obligans), and the manifesting norm. The
discriminating norm is, as we have just seen, human nature itself, objectively
considered. It is, so to speak, the book in which is written the text of the
law, and the classification of human actions into good and bad. Strictly
speaking, our nature is the proximate discriminating norm or standard. The
remote and ultimate norm, of which it is the partial reflection and
application, is the Divine nature itself, the ultimate groundwork of the
created order. The binding or obligatory norm is the Divine authority, imposing
upon the rational creature the obligation of living in conformity with his
nature, and thus with the universal order established by the Creator. Contrary
to the Kantian theory that we must not acknowledge any other lawgiver than
conscience, the truth is that reason as conscience is only immediate moral authority which we are called
upon to obey, and conscience itself owes its authority to the fact that it is
the mouthpiece of the Divine will and imperium.
The manifesting norm (norma denuntians), which determines the moral
quality of actions tried by the discriminating norm, is reason. Through this
faculty we perceive what is the moral constitution of our nature, what kind of
action it calls for, and whether a particular action possesses this requisite
character.
THE
CONTENTS OF THE NATURAL LAW
Radically,
the natural law consists of one supreme and universal principle, from which are
derived all our natural moral obligations or duties. We cannot discuss here the
many erroneous opinions regarding the fundamental rule of life. Some of them
are utterly false-for instance, that of Bentham, who made the pursuit of
utility or temporal pleasure the foundation of the moral code, and that of
Fichte, who taught that the supreme obligation is to love self above everything
and all others on account of self. Others present the true idea in an imperfect
or one-sided fashion. Epicurus, for example, held the supreme principle to be,
"Follow nature"; the Stoics inculcated living according to reason.
But these philosophers interpreted their principles in a manner less in
conformity with our doctrine than the tenor of their words suggests. Catholic
moralists, though agreeing upon the underlying conception of the Natural Law,
have differed more or less in their expression of its fundamental formula.
Among many others we find the following: "Love God as the end and
everything on account of Him"; "Live conformably to human nature
considered in all its essential respects"; "Observe the rational
order established and sanctioned by God"; "Manifest in your life the
image of God impressed on your rational nature." The exposition of St.
Thomas is at once the most simple and philosophic. Starting from the premise
that good is what primarily falls under the apprehension of the practical
reason-that is of reason acting as the dictator of conduct-and that,
consequently, the supreme principle of moral action must have the good as its
central idea, he holds that the supreme principle, from which all the other
principles and precepts are derived, is that good is to be done, and evil
avoided (I-II, Q, xciv, a. 2).
Passing
from the primary principle to the subordinate principles and conclusions,
moralists divide these into two classes: (1) those dictates of reason which
flow so directly from the primary principle that they hold in practical reason
the same place as evident propositions in the speculative sphere, or are at
least easily deducible from the primary principle. Such, for instance, are
"Adore God"; "Honour your parents"; "Do not
steal"; (2) those other conclusions and precepts which are reached only
through a more or less complex course of inference. It is this difficulty and
uncertainty that requires the natural law to be supplemented by positive law,
human and Divine. As regards the vigour and binding force of these precepts and
conclusions, theologians divide them into two classes, primary and secondary.
To the first class belong those which must, under all circumstances, be
observed if the essential moral order is to be maintained. The secondary
precepts are those whose observance contributes to the public and private good
and is required for the perfection of moral development, but is not so
absolutely necessary to the rationality of conduct that it may not be lawfully
omitted under some special conditions. For example, under no circumstances is
polyandry compatible with the moral order, while polygamy, though inconsistent
with human relations in their proper moral and social development, is not
absolutely incompatible with them under less civilized conditions.
III. THE
QUALITIES OF THE NATURAL LAW
(a) The
natural law is universal,
that is to say, it applies to the entire human race, and is in itself the same
for all. Every man, because he is a man, is bound, if he will conform to the
universal order willed by the Creator, to live conformably to his own rational
nature, and to be guided by reason. However, infants and insane persons, who
have not the actual use of their reason and cannot therefore know the law, are
not responsible for that failure to comply with its demands. (b) The natural
law is immutable in itself and also extrinsically.
Since it is founded in the very nature of man and his destination to his
end-two bases which rest upon the immutable ground of the eternal law-it
follows that, assuming the continued existence of human nature, it cannot cease
to exist. The natural law commands and forbids in the same tenor everywhere and
always. We must, however, remember that this immutability pertains not to those
abstract imperfect formulæ in which the law is commonly expressed, but to the
moral standard as it applies to action in the concrete, surrounded with all its
determinate conditions. We enunciate, for instance, one of the leading precepts
in the words: "Thou shalt not kill"; yet the taking of human life is
sometimes a lawful, and even an obligatory act. Herein exists no variation in
the law; what the law forbids is not all taking of life, but all unjust taking
of life.
With
regard to the possibility of any change by abrogation or dispensation, there
can be no question of such being introduced by any authority except that of God
Himself. But reason forbids us to think that even He could exercise such power,
because, given the hypothesis that He wills man to exist, He wills him
necessarily to live conformably to the eternal law, by observing in his conduct
the law of reason. The Almighty, then, cannot be conceived as willing this and
simultaneously willing the contradictory, that man should be set free from the
law entirely through its abrogation, or partially through dispensation from it.
It is true that some of the older theologians, followed or copied by some later
ones, hold that God can dispense, and, in fact in some instances, has dispensed
from the secondary precepts of the natural law, while others maintain that the
bearing of the natural law is changed by the operation of positive law.
However, an examination of the arguments offered in support of these opinions
shows that the alleged examples of dispensation are: (a) cases where a change
of conditions modifies the application of the law, or (b) cases concerning
obligations not imposed as absolutely essential to the moral order, though
their fulfillment is necessary for the full perfection of conduct, or (c)
instances of addition made to the law.
As
examples of the first category are cited God's permission to the Hebrews to
despoil the Egyptians, and His command to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. But it is
not necessary to see in these cases a dispensation from the precepts forbidding
theft and murder. As the Sovereign Lord of all things, He could withdraw from
Isaac his right to life, and from the Egyptians their right of ownership, with
the result that neither would the killing of Isaac be an unjust destruction of
life, nor the appropriation of the Egyptians' goods the unjust taking of
another's property. The classic instance alleged as an example of (b) is the legalization
of polygamy among the Hebrews. Polygamy, however, is not under all
circumstances incompatible with the essential principles of a rationally
ordered life, since the chief ends prescribed by nature for the marital
union-the propagation of the race and the due care and education of
offspring-may, in certain states of society, be attained in a polygamous union.
The theory that God can dispense from any part of the law, even from the
secondary precepts, is scarcely compatible with the doctrine, which is the
common teaching of the School, that the natural law is founded on the eternal
law, and, therefore, has for its ultimate ground the immutable essence of God
himself. As regards (c), when positive law, human or Divine, imposes
obligations which only modify the bearing of the natural law, it cannot
correctly be said to change it. Positive law may not ordain anything contrary
to the natural law, from which it draws its authority; but it may-and this is
one of its functions-determine with more precision the bearing of the natural
law, and for good reasons, supplement its conclusions. For example, in the eyes
of the natural law mutual verbal agreement to a contract is sufficient; yet, in
many kinds of contract, the civil law declares that no agreement shall be
valid, unless it be expressed in writing and signed by the parties before
witnesses. In establishing this rule the civil authority merely exercises the
power which it derives from the natural law to add to the operation of the
natural law such conditions as the common good may call for. Contrary to the
almost universally received doctrine, a few theologians held erroneously that
the natural law depends not on the essential necessary will of God, but upon
His arbitrary positive will, and taught consistently with this view, that the
natural law may be dispensed from or even abrogated by God. The conception,
however, that the moral law is but an arbitrary enactment of the Creator,
involves the denial of any absolute distinction between right and wrong-a denial
which, of course, sweeps away the very foundation of the entire moral order.
IV. OUR
KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW
Founded
in our nature and revealed to us by our reason, the moral law is known to us in
the measure that reason brings a knowledge of it home to our understanding. The
question arises: How far can man be ignorant of the natural law, which, as St.
Paul says, is written in the human heart (Rom., ii, 14)? The general teaching
of theologians is that the supreme and primary principles are necessarily known
to every one having the actual use of reason. These principles are really
reducible to the primary principle which is expressed by St. Thomas in the
form: "Do good and avoid evil". Wherever we find man we find him with
a moral code, which is founded on the first principle that good is to be done
and evil avoided. When we pass from the universal to more particular
conclusions, the case is different. Some follow immediately from the primary,
and are so self-evident that they are reached without any complex course of
reasoning. Such are, for example: "Do not commit adultery";
"Honour your parents". No person whose reason and moral nature is
ever so little developed can remain in ignorance of such precepts except
through his own fault. Another class of conclusions comprises those which are
reached only by a more or less complex course of reasoning. These may remain
unknown to, or be misinterpreted even by persons whose intellectual development
is considerable. To reach these more remote precepts, many facts and minor
conclusions must be correctly appreciated, and, in estimating their value, a
person may easily err, and consequently, without moral fault, come to a false
conclusion.
A few
theologians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, following some older
ones, maintained that there cannot exist in anyone practical ignorance of the
natural law. This opinion however has no weight (for the controversy see
Bouquillon, "Theologia Fundamentalis", n. 74). Theoretically
speaking, man is capable of acquiring a full knowledge of the moral law, which
is, as we have seen, nothing but the dictates of reason properly exercised.
Actually, taking into consideration the power of passion, prejudice, and other
influences which cloud the understanding or pervert the will, one can safely
say that man, unaided by supernatural revelation, would not acquire a full and
correct knowledge of the contents of the natural law (cf. Vatican Council,
Sess. III, cap. ii). In proof we need but recall that the noblest ethical
teaching of pagans, such as the systems of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics,
was disfigured by its approbation of shockingly immoral actions and practices.
As the
fundamental and all-embracing obligation imposed upon man by the Creator, the
natural law is the one to which all his other obligations are attached. The
duties imposed on us in the supernatural law come home to us, because the
natural law and its exponent, conscience, tell us that, if God has vouchsafed
to us a supernatural revelation with a series of precepts, we are bound to
accept and obey it. The natural law is the foundation of all human law inasmuch
as it ordains that man shall live in society, and society for its constitution
requires the existence of an authority, which shall possess the moral power necessary
to control the members and direct them to the common good. Human laws are valid
and equitable only in so far as they correspond with, and enforce or supplement
the natural law; they are null and void when they conflict with it. The United
States system of equity courts, as distinguished from those engaged in the
administration of the common law, are founded on the principle that, when the
law of the legislator is not in harmony with the dictates of the natural law,
equity (æquitas, epikeia) demands that it be set aside or corrected. St.
Thomas explains the lawfulness of this procedure. Because human actions, which
are the subject of laws, are individual and innumerable, it is not possible to
establish any law that may not sometimes work out unjustly. Legislators,
however, in passing laws, attend to what commonly happens, though to apply the
common rule will sometimes work injustice and defeat the intention of the law
itself. In such cases it is bad to follow the law; it is good to set aside its
letter and follow the dictates of justice and the common good (II-II, Q. cxx,
a. 1). Logically, chronologically, and ontologically antecedent to all human
society for which it provides the indispensable basis, the natural or moral law
is neither-as Hobbes, in anticipation of the modern positivistic school,
taught-a product of social agreement or convention, nor a mere congeries of the
actions, customs, and ways of man, as claimed by the ethicists who, refusing to
acknowledge the First Cause as a Personality with whom one entertains personal
relations, deprive the law of its obligatory basis. It is a true law, for
through it the Divine Mind imposes on the subject minds of His rational
creatures their obligations and prescribes their duties.
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On this
subject consult: Summa Theol., I-II, QQ. xci, xciv; I, Q. lxxix, a. 12; Suarez, De Legibus, II, v-xvii; Meyer, Institutiones Juris Naturalis, II. The natural law is treated in all
Catholic text-books of ethics. A good exposition in English will be found in Rickaby, Moral Philosophy (London, 1888); Hill, Ethics or Moral Philosophy (Baltimore, 1888). Consult also: Robinson, Elements of American Jurisprudence (Boston, 1900); Lilly, Right and Wrong (London, 1890); Ming, The Data of Modern Ethics Examined (New York, 1897);Bouquillon, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis (Ratisbon and New York, 1890); Blackstone, Commentaries, I, introd., sec. i.
