THE PHILOSOPHER IN SOCIETY
The Power of the Philosopher
A PHILOSOPHER is a man in search of wisdom, Wisdom does not indeed seem to be an exceedingly widespread commodity; there has never been overproduction in this field. The greater the scarcity of what the philosopher is supposed to be concerned with, the more we feel inclined to think that society needs the philosopher badly.
Unfortunately there is no such thing as the philosopher; this dignified abstraction exists only in our minds. There are philosophers; and philosophers, as soon as they philosophize, are, or seem to be, in disagreement on everything, even on the first principles of philosophy. Each one goes his own way. They question every matter of common assent, and their answers are conflicting. What can be expected from them for the good of society.
Moreover the greatness of a philosopher and the truth of his philosophy are independent values. Great philosophers may happen to be in the wrong. Historians bestow the honor of having been the “fathers of the modern world” upon two men, the first of whom was a great dreamer and a poor philosopher, namely Jean Jacques Rousseau; the second a poor dreamer and a great philosopher, namely Hegel. And Hegel has involved the modern world in still more far-reaching and still more deadly errors than Rousseau did.
At least this very fact makes manifest to us the power and importance of philosophers, for good and for evil. (Aesop, if I remember correctly, said as much of that valuable organ—the tongue.) If bad philosophy is a plague for society, what a blessing good philosophy must be for it! Let us not forget, moreover, that if Hegel was the father of the world of today insofar as it denies the superiority of the human person and the transcendence of God, and kneels before history, St. Augustine was the father of Christian Western civilization, in which the world of today, despite all threats and failures, still participates.
To look at things in a more analytical way, let us say that in actual existence society cannot do without philosophers.
Even when they are in the wrong, philosophers are a kind of mirror, on the heights of intelligence, of the deepest trends which are obscurely at play in the human mind at each epoch of history; (the greater they are, the more actively and powerfully radiant the mirror is). Now, since we are thinking beings, such mirrors are indispensable to us. After all, it is better for human society to have Hegelian errors with Hegel than to have Hegelian errors without Hegel—I mean hidden and diffuse errors rampant throughout the social body, which are Hegelian in type but anonymous and unrecognizable. A great philosopher in the wrong is like a beacon on the reefs, which says to seamen: steer clear of me. He enables men (at least those who have not been seduced by him) to identify the errors from which they suffer, and to become clearly aware of them, and to struggle against them. This is an essential need of society, insofar as society is not merely animal society, but made up of persons endowed with intelligence and freedom.
Even if philosophers are hopelessly divided among themselves in their search for a superior and all-pervading truth, at least they seek this truth; and their very controversies, constantly renewed, are a sign of the necessity for such a search. These controversies do not witness to the illusory or unattainable character of the object that these philosophers are looking for. They witness to the fact that this object is so difficult because it is crucial in importance: is not everything which is crucial in importance crucial also in difficulty? Plato told us that beautiful things are difficult, and that we should not avoid beautiful dangers. Mankind would be in jeopardy, and soon in despair, if it shunned the beautiful dangers of intelligence and reason. Moreover many things are questionable and oversimplified in the commonplace insistence on the insuperable disagreements which divide philosophers. These disagreements do indeed exist. But in one sense there is more continuity and stability on philosophy than in science. For a new scientific theory completely changes the very manner in which the former ones posed the question, whereas philosophical problems remain always the same, in one form or another. Nay more, basic philosophical ideas, once they have been discovered, become permanent acquisitions in the philosophical heritage. They are used in various, even opposite ways: they are still there. Finally, philosophers quarrel so violently because each one has seen some truth which, more often than not, has dazzled his eyes, and which he may conceptualize in an insane manner, but of which his fellow-philosophers must also be aware, each in his own perspective.
What is the Use of Philosophy?
At this point we come to the essential consideration: what is the use of philosophy? Philosophy, taken in itself, is above utility. And for this very reason philosophy is of the utmost necessity for men. It reminds them of the supreme utility of those things which do not deal with means, but with ends. For men do not live only by bread, vitamins, and technological discoveries. They live by values and realities which are above time, and are worth being known for their own sake; they feed on that invisible food which sustains the life of the spirit, and which makes them aware, not of such or such means at the service of their life, but of their very reasons for living—and suffering and hoping.
The philosophers in society witnesses to the supreme dignity of thought; he points to what is eternal in man, and stimulates our thirst for pure knowledge and disinterested knowledge, for knowledge of those fundamentals—about the nature of things and the nature of the mind, and man himself, and God—which are superior to, and independent of, anything we can make or produce or create—and to which all our practice is appendent, because we think before acting and nothing can limit the range of thought: our practical decisions depend on the stand we take on the ultimate questions that human thought is able to ask. That is why philosophical systems, which are directed toward no practical use and application have, as I remarked at the beginning, such an impact on human history.
The advocates of dialectical materialism claim that philosophy does not have to contemplate, but to transform the world: because philosophy is essentially praxis, instrument for action, power exercised on things. This is to return to the old magical confusion between knowledge and power, a perfect disregard of the function of thought. Philosophy is essentially a disinterested activity, directed toward truth loved for its own sake, not utilitarian activity for the sake of power over things. That is why we need it. If philosophy is one of the forces which contribute to the movement of history and the changes that occur in the world, it is because philosophy, in its primary task, which is the metaphysical penetration of being, is intent only on discerning and contemplating what is the truth of certain matters which have importance in themselves and for themselves, independently of what happens in the world, and which, precisely for that reason, exert an essential influence on the world.
Two aspects of the function of the philosopher in society have, it seems to me, special significance today. They have to do with Truth and Freedom.
The great danger which threatens modern societies is a weakening of the sense of Truth. On the one hand men become so accustomed to thinking in terms of stimuli and responses, and adjustment to environment; on the other hand they are so bewildered by the manner in which the political techniques of advertising and propaganda use the words of language that they are tempted finally to give up any interest in truth: only practical results, or sheer material verification of facts and figures, matter for them, without internal adherence to any truth really grasped. The philosopher who is pursuing his speculative task pays no attention to the interests of men or of the social groups, or of the state, reminds society of the absolute and unbending character of Truth.
As to Freedom, he reminds society that freedom is the very condition for the exercise of thought. This is a requirement of the common good itself of human society, which disintegrates as soon as fear, superseding inner convictions, imposes any kind of shibboleth upon human minds. The philosopher, even when he is wrong at least freely criticizes many things his fellowmen are attracted to. Socrates bore witness to this function of criticism which is inherent in philosophy. Even though society showed its gratitude to him in a quite peculiar way, he remains the great example of the philosopher in society. It is not without reason that Napoleon loathed idéologues, and that dictators, as a rule, hate philosophers.
Moral Philosophy
I have spoken above all of speculative or theoretical philosophy, the chief part of which is metaphysics. The name of Socrates calls forth another kind of philosophy, namely moral or practical philosophy.
Here the need of society for philosophy, and for sound philosophy, appears in a more immediate and urgent manner.
It has been often observed that science provides us with means—more and more powerful, more and more wondrous means. These means can be used for good or for evil, depending on the ends to which they are used. The determination on the true and genuine ends of human life is not within the province of science. It is within the province of wisdom. In other words, it is within the province philosophy—and, to tell the truth, not of philosophical wisdom alone, but of God-given wisdom. Society needs philosophers in this connection. It needs saints even more.
On the other hand the human sciences—psychology, sociology, anthropology—afford us with invaluable and ever-growing material dealing with the behavior of individual and collective man and with the basic components of human life and civilization. This is an immense help in our effort to penetrate the world of man. But all this material and this immense treasure of facts would be of no avail if it were not interpreted, so as to enlighten us on what man is. It is up to the philosopher to undertake this task of interpretation.
My point is that society is in special need of this sort of work. For merely material information, or any kind of Kinsey report, on human mores, is rather of a nature to shatter the root beliefs of any given society, as long as it is not accompanied by genuine knowledge of man, which depends, in the last analysis, on wisdom and philosophy. Only the philosophical knowledge of man permits us, for example, to distinguish between what is conformable to the nature and reason of man, and the way in which men do in fact conduct themselves, indeed in the majority of cases; in other words, to distinguish between the modes of behavior which are really normal and modes of comportment which are statistically frequent.
Finally when I comes to moral values and moral standards, the consideration of our present world authorizes us to make the following remark: it is a great misfortune that a civilization should suffer from a cleavage between the ideal which constitutes its reason for living and acting, and for which it continues to fight, and the inner cast of mind which exists in people, and which implies in reality doubt and mental insecurity about this same ideal. As a matter of fact, the common psyche of a society or a civilization, the memory of past experiences, family and community traditions, and the sort of emotional temperament, or vegetative structure of feeling, which have been thus engendered, may maintain in the practical conduct of men a deep-seated devotion to standards and values in which their intellect has ceased to believe. Under such circumstances they are even prepared to die, if necessary, for refusing to commit some unethical action of for defending justice or freedom, but they are at a loss to find any rational justification for the notions of justice, freedom, ethical behavior; these things no longer have for their minds any objective and unconditional value, perhaps any meaning. Such a situation is possible; it cannot last. A time will come when people will give up in practical existence those values about which they no longer have any intellectual conviction. Hence we realize how necessary the function of a sound moral philosophy is in human society. It has to give, or to give back, to society intellectual faith in the value of its ideals.
These remarks apply to democratic society in a particularly cogent way, for the foundations of a society of free men are essentially moral. There are a certain number of moral tenets—about the dignity of the human person, human rights, human equality, freedom, law, mutual respect and tolerance, the unity of mankind and the ideal of peace among men—on which democracy presupposed common consent; without a general, firm, and reasoned-out conviction concerning such tenets, democracy cannot survive. It is not the job of scientists, experts, specialists, and technicians, it is the job of philosophers to look for the rational justification and elucidation of the democratic charter. In this sense, it is not uncalled-for to say that the philosopher plays in society as to principles, as important a part as the statesman as to practical government. Both may be great destroyers if they are mistaken. Both may be genuine servants of the common good, if they are on the right road. Nothing is more immediately necessary for our times than a sound political philosophy.
I would betray my own convictions if I did not add that—given on the one hand the state of confusion and division in which the modern mind finds itself, on the other hand the fact that the deepest incentive if democratic thought is, as Henri Bergson observed, a repercussion of the Gospel’s inspiration in the temporal order—philosophy, especially moral and political philosophy, can perform its normal function in our modern society, especially as regards the need of democratic society for a genuine rational establishment of its common basic tenets, only if it keeps vital continuity with the spirit of the Judaeo-Christian tradition and with the wisdom of the Gospel, in other words, if it is a work and effort of human reason intent on the most exacting requirements of philosophical method and principles, equipped with all the weapons and information of contemporary science, and guided by the light of the supreme truths of which the Christian faith makes us aware.
I know that the notion of Christian philosophy is a controversial notion, and rather complicated. I have no intention of discussing that problem here. I should like only to point out that we cannot help posing it. As for myself, the more I think about the relationship between philosophy and theology in the course of history, the more I am convinced that in the concrete existence this problem is solved in a favorable to the notion of Christian philosophy.
One final point should be touched upon; I will limit myself to a few remarks on it. It has to do with the philosopher’s attitude toward human, social, political affairs.
Needless to say, a philosopher may set aside his philosophical pursuits and become an man of politics. But what of a philosopher who remains simply a philosopher, and acts only as a philosopher?
On the one hand we may suppose, without fear of being wrong, that he lacks the experience, the information, and the competence which are proper to a man of action: it would be a misfortune for him to undertake to legislate in social and political matters in the name of pure logic, as Plato did.
But, on the other hand, the philosopher cannot—especially in our time—shut himself up in an ivory tower; he cannot help being concerned about human affairs, in the name of philosophy itself and by reason of the very values which philosophy has to defend and maintain. He has to bear witness to these values, every time they are attacked, as in the time of Hitler when insane racist theories worked to provoke the mass murder of Jews, or as today before the threat by communist despotism. The philosopher must bear witness by expressing his thoughts and telling the truth as he sees it. This may have repercussions in the domain of politics; it is not, in itself, a political action—it is simply applied philosophy.
It is true that the line of demarcation is difficult to draw. This means no one, not even philosophers, can avoid taking risks, when justice or love are at stake, and when one is face to face with the strict command of the Gospel: haec oportuit facere, et illa non omittere, “these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone” (Mt 23:23).
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Source: On the Use of Philosophy: Three Essays, by Jacques Maritain. (1961)
("The Philosopher in Society" is the first of three essays.)
The Death of Socrates, by Jean-François-Pierre Peyron.
Oil on canvas, 1788; Joslyn Art Museum, Omaha.
