On Philosophy and Theology

Procedural Distinction Between Philosophy and Theology

“Just as the beginning of natural knowledge consists in a knowing about creatures as a result of sense perception, so the beginning of the knowledge that is given from above consists in the knowing of the first truth by means of infused faith. As a consequence, the process from such beginnings follows different orders. The philosophers, who follow the order of natural cognition, place the scientific knowledge of creatures before the divine science; that is, the philosophy of nature comes before metaphysics. On the other hand, the contrary procedure is followed among the theologians, so that the consideration of the Creator precedes the consideration of creatures.”

(St. Thomas: Exposition of Boethius on the Trinity, Prologue.)


On the Use of Philosophy by the Theologian

“As sacred doctrine is based on the light of faith, so is philosophy founded on the natural light of reason. Hence, it is impossible for items that belong to philosophy to be contrary to those that pertain to faith; but the former may be defective in comparison to the latter. Yet, they contain some likenesses and some prolegomena to the latter, just as nature is a preamble to grace. If any point among the statements of the philosophers is found contrary to the faith, this is not philosophy but rather an abuse of philosophy, resulting from a defect in reasoning. So, it is possible, from the principles of philosophy, to refute an error of this kind, either by showing that it is an impossibility, or by showing that it is not a necessary conclusion. Just as items of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, so items that are contrary to them cannot demonstratively be shown to be false; yet it is possible to show that they are not necessarily convincing.

"And so, we can use philosophy in sacred doctrine in three ways: (1) to demonstrate items that are preambles to faith, such as those things that are proved about God by natural processes of reasoning: that God exists, that God is one, and similar points about God or creatures that are proved in philosophy and which faith takes as established; (2) to make known those items that belong to the faith by means of certain similitudes; thus Augustine (in his book On Order, 9-12) uses many likenesses taken from philosophical teachings to show something about the Trinity; and (3) to oppose statements against the faith, either by showing that they are false, or by showing that they are not necessarily true.”

(St. Thomas: Exposition of Boethius on the Trinity, II, 3.)

Source: Translated by Vernon J. Bourke in The Pocket Aquinas.

Read more: Super Boethium De Trinitate by Thomas Aquinas.

Boethius teaching his students.

Initial in a 1385 Italian manuscript of the Consolation.

“Nobody can do without theology”

“THE intellectual and political history of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Reformation and the Counter Reformation, the internal state of British society after the Revolution in England, the achievements of the Pilgrim Fathers, the Rights of Man, and the further events in world history have their starting point in the great disputes on nature and grace of our classical age. Neither Dante nor Cervantes nor Rabelais nor Shakespeare nor John Donne nor William Blake, nor even Oscar Wilde or D.H. Lawrence, nor Giotto, nor Michelangelo nor El Greco nor Zurbaran, nor Pascal nor Rousseau, nor Madison nor Jefferson nor Edgar Allan Poe nor Baudelaire, nor Goethe nor Nietzsche nor even Karl Marx, nor Tolstoy nor Dostoevski is actually understandable without a serious theological background. Modern philosophy itself, from Descartes to Hegel, remains enigmatic without that, for in actual fact philosophy has burdened itself all through modern times with problems and anxieties taken over from theology, so that the cultural advent of a philosophy purely philosophical is still to be waited for.

“In the cultural life of the Middle Ages philosophy was subservient to theology or rather wrapped up in it; in that of modern times it was but secularized theology. Thus the considerations I have laid down regarding philosophy are still truer of theology. Nobody can do without theology, at least a concealed and unconscious theology, and the best way of avoiding the inconveniences of an insinuated theology is to deal with theology that is consciously aware of itself. And liberal education cannot complete its task without the knowledge of the specific realm and the concerns of theological wisdom.”

~Jacques Maritain: Education at the Crossroads.

Theology (ceiling tondo), by Raffaelo Sanzio.
Fresco, 1509-11; Stanza della Segnatura, Palazzi Pontifici, Vatican.

Maritain: types of knowledge

THERE is a multitude of assertions which are, in themselves, reformable: not only the hypothetical or probable assertions, but also the assertions themselves with which explanatory theory (I do not speak of that which is mere verification of fact) constructs itself in the sciences of phenomena, which are a knowledge of the observable as such, and refrain from piercing the crust of the observable. However far indeed one may extend it the observation remains inevitably limited, it is impossible to extend it infinitely far: so that, in itself, every system of rational interpretation of phenomena on the plane itself of phenomena can have to give way to a different system, occasions by new observations and more fully comprehensive. No scientific theory is irreformable or absolutely true; it is true only relatively to the state of science at the different stages of its progress. In the rationalization of the observable effected by the sciences of phenomena, truth is the adequation of the intelligence with that which falls under an observation as complete as possible at a given time of human history.

It is altogether different with knowledges such as philosophy and theology. Philosophy (metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of nature, moral philosophy…) is capable of emitting irreformable assertions, in other words absolute truths, because it bears on intelligible being itself, or the real attained purely and simply (and not only as to the observable as such). When it says the true, and to the extent that it says the true, that which it says is absolutely true, and true for always. This is that to which the primary and most deep-seated ẻlan of the intelligence tends, and that for which it is most fundamentally thirsty.

When we say that truth is the adequation of the intelligence and of that which is, this is understood therefore primarily and above all of the adequation of the intelligence with “that which is” purely and simply, as it is the case for philosophy and theology. And it is understood secondarily (by extension to a type of knowledge enclosed completely in that which appears to the senses) of the adequation of the intelligence with “that which is” under a certain relation only (under the relation of observability), as it is the case for the sciences of phenomena.

Philosophy, which bears on the intimate intelligible structure of that which is, absolutely speaking, and theology, which bears on the intimate superintelligible mystery of Him Who is, absolutely speaking, are types of knowledge exceptionally difficult in themselves. This is why man has so often erred in them.

In science, knowledge less elevated and more narrow, which is a late fruit of human thought (it began only in the sixteenth century to disengage itself in its proper nature), and which bears on the rational interpretation and the rational organization (above all, there where it is possible, mathematization) of that only which appears to the senses, man errs also but does not cease to correct his errors with an inviolable regularity, because the retracing of the intelligence imposed by such a type of knowledge requires particularly rigorous methods and specializations; but the truth which we have then to do is truth only secundum quid, approximate truth.

The Scientists know this; the noninitiated do not know it. Let us turn, in a last remark, to the side of the human community. If the idea that no higher knowledge, neither philosophy, nor theology, is capable of absolute truth became generally accepted, the result would be that the world of culture would find itself, ─not through the fault of science, ─mystified by science. For it is the assertions of science, haloed with its dazzling application, which a multitude of people who are not scientists would take then for “the truth” (absolute) of which by virtue of the very nature of the intelligence they experience unconsciously the need; whereas the scientists would continue to know, and better and better, that, however precious the progresses of science may  be, irreformable assertions and absolute truths are not of the domain of the latter.

~Jacques Maritain: On the Church of Christ, Chap. IV, n. 4.
 

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Aquinas on Theology

• “There are two kinds of theology. One follows the reasonable course of inferring divine truths from meanings governing the physical world: it is thus that philosophers, claiming for fundamental philosophy, or metaphysics, the title of the divine science, have discussed theological truths. The other, while appreciating that at present when we are wayfarers we cannot see for ourselves the supreme evidence of divine truths, already begins through infused faith to take after and share in God’s knowledge by cleaving to His fundamental truth for its own sake.” (Exposition of the De Trinitate, 2, 2.)

• “The purpose of theology is threefold: to refute error, to teach sound morals, and to contemplate truth.” (On the Sentences I, Prol. 1, 5.)

• “Theology deserves to be called the highest wisdom, for everything is viewed in light of the first cause.” (Summa Contra Gentes, 2, 4.)

• “This doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says: "Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ" (2 Cor 10:5).” (Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 1, a. 8, ad. 2.)

• “The fact that some happen to doubt about articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths, but to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said in de Animalibus xi.” (Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1.)

• “The principles of reason are the foundations of philosophy, the principles of faith are the foundations of Christian theology. The truths of philosophy are more restricted; they cannot be contrary to the truths of faith, but instead offer likenesses and anticipations of them. Nature is the prelude to grace.” (Exposition of the De Trinitate, 2, 3.)

Theology (ceiling tondo), by Raffaello Sanzio.
Fresco, 1509-11; Stanza della Segnatura,
Palazzi Pontifici, Vatican.